Still in the news

The CA HSRA (California High Speed Rail Authority) is still at work, despite being cut off from its State bond issue funds.  On May 6 & 7 there was another board meeting where they approved its latest URS Corp 20,000 page EIR (environmental impact report) and cost estimate.

In its coverage of the meeting, the LA Times May 7, 2014 article is written like a humorous editorial.  One gets the impression that it is standard procedure for the CA HSRA to be comical; or an appalling pursuit of hostility against California residents displayed as political wrath in maintaining an insane agenda.  The political stance by the staff and HSRA Board doesn’t seem to believe the expensive costs of erecting its proposed antique train technology project.   The political will for building this 150 year old technology refuses to accept reality of high costs for steel, concrete and real estate procurement.    

When Jerry Brown became governor again, he announced that the HSR system would only cost $68billion, not the estimated $98billion.  His reasoning was that the $98billion was too expensive.  So he declared a lower cost to the public.  That’s like saying: “It’s going to cost less because I say it’s going to cost less.”  There is no justification for a lower cost.  Peer groups in the transportation industry were speculating normal government cost overruns would put the overall cost of completion at $212billion, not the conservative and more politically acceptable $98billion.

Most supporters of the proposed HSR work in other industries and rely on information provided by the multimillion dollar advertising campaigns from the CA HSRA.  The advertising companies don’t provide the staggering costs involved in building this type of antiquated heavy rail train system.  Average costs of building this type of heavy steel wheel on rail electric train is $70million per mile at grade (just laying the track on the ground), $150 million per mile elevated (17 ft above ground) and $300million per mile underground.

At the center of controversy is its cost.  Underlying cause of disputes about the costs is due to intended deception by particular politicians that felt the proposed project wouldn’t be supported by voters if its costs were honestly revealed.   This was seen when the original bond passed by a narrow margin in 2008.  That bond issue was for $9.1 billion to be spent on the HSR.  The HSRA arrived at their cost estimates ($25million spent by the HSRA to five separate transportation engineering consultant firms) by using the standard at grade cost estimate of building the 700 mile HSR project at $70million per mile; a total of $49billion.  It is mystifying that politicians would then sell the project to voters at $9.1billion.  Even with the unrealistic price tag of an at grade estimate the project was pushed to the voters at the deceptive rate of $9.1billion.  In the fine print of the 1A bond, the $49billion was mentioned, yet a definitive clarification where the lacking $40billion comes from has always remained void.     

Points in the lawsuits against the HSRA show perverse conflicts to the original bond issue promised to voters.  The presiding judge agreed with the plaintiff and froze the bond issues from being released to the market.  HSRA current funds are a grant from the US Dept. of Transportation. 
  

At the May 2014 meeting the HSRA board also approved the section’s 15% cost increase.  The new estimate falls short of standard implementation costs for this type of system.  At its 15% increase, URS estimates are $8million per mile lower than a typical steel wheel on rail train systems of this type.  The newly approved EIR includes a cost estimate for the 112 mile segment at $7.13billion.  Typical systems cost $70million per mile.  For URS to suggest $62million per mile is a significant savings.  It is the opinion of this writer that URS has done an exemplary job in reducing costs, however, in knowing the general procedure of how the government operates; estimates are always obliterated by blueprint conflicts, unforeseen obstacles and errors which lead to massive cost overruns amounting to double and triple original cost estimates.   

It appears that the opinion of the HSRA says their only required mandate is to approve the phase one valley section EIR of the proposed project in order to begin the work.